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Abstract
The fate of optimality modeling is typically linked to that of adaptationism: the two
are thought to stand or fall together (Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Orzack and Sober,
1994). I argue here that this is mistaken. The debate over adaptationism has tended to
focus on one particular use of optimality models, which I refer to here as their strong
use. The strong use of an optimality model involves the claim that selection is the
only important influence on the evolutionary outcome in question and is thus linked to
adaptationism. However, biologists seldom intend this strong use of optimality mod-
els. One common alternative that I term the weak use simply involves the claim that
an optimality model accurately represents the role of selection in bringing about the
outcome. This and other weaker uses of optimality models insulate the optimality
approach from criticisms of adaptationism, and they account for the prominence of
optimality modeling (broadly construed) in population biology. The centrality of these
uses of optimality models ensures a continuing role for the optimality approach, re-
gardless of the fate of adaptationism.
Keywords: adaptationism, behavioral ecology, evolution, natural selection, optimality
modeling, population biology
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Criticisms of adaptationism have been well-articulated and assimilated into the think-
ing of most population biologists and philosophers of biology, and optimality modeling is
typically regarded to be adaptationism’s henchman. Consequently, when one defends the
value of optimality models to evolutionary biology, the first question posed is often, “but
what about all of the problems with adaptationism?” My aim here is to decouple optimality
modeling from adaptationism.
Distinct theses are lumped under the term “adaptationism” (Orzack and Sober, 1994;
Godfrey-Smith, 2001), but roughly, the idea is that selection is the only important influence
on evolutionary change (Orzack and Sober, 1994) and that, for this reason, phenotypic
traits typically attain optimal values (Gould and Lewontin, 1979). Gould and Lewontin’s
seminal paper (1979) formulated these criticisms in terms of optimality modeling, and others
have followed suit. Optimality models—equilibrium models that represent the evolution of
a phenotypic trait as a function of the relative fitnesses of the trait values—are thought
to presuppose the ubiquity and omnipotence of selection and to ignore the possibility of
constraints and other non-selective evolutionary factors. These models are consequently
held to be suspect.
In contrast, I argue in this paper that the legitimate and fruitful use of optimality models
does not require the vindication of adaptationism. The situation is that of the baby and the
bathwater. Criticisms of adaptationism should be taken seriously (as they in fact are), and
these criticisms do have implications for optimality modeling. Yet optimality modeling does
not require the truth of adaptationism in order to be a valuable tool for population biology.
Only one particular use of optimality models—what I call their strong use—is directly linked
to adaptationism. The strong use of an optimality model involves the claim that selection
is the only important factor influencing the evolutionary outcome in question.
Interestingly, whereas most philosophical literature focuses on this strong use, population
biologists oftentimes employ the optimality approach for other purposes. Optimality models
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are frequently used simply to represent the role of selection in bringing about an evolutionary
outcome, and even just to preliminarily investigate the mere possibility of selective influence
on a trait. Neither of these weaker uses of optimality models involves the claim that selection
is the only important influence on the evolutionary outcome that is modeled. Thus, although
the fates of the strong use of optimality models and adaptationism are tightly linked, the
same is not true for other uses of optimality models. Weaker uses of optimality models do
not require the vindication of adaptationism to establish their legitimacy. Because these
weaker uses are quite common in—and quite valuable to—population biology, critiques of
adaptationism have a limited impact on the well-foundedness of the optimality approach.
1 Di!erent Uses of Optimality Models
The optimality approach provides a way to model evolution by natural selection purely
phenotypically, without directly representing the system of genetic transmission. Optimality
models proceed according to the following schema. One determines the range of possible trait
values for the phenotype of interest and the fitness function that relates these phenotypic
trait values to their success in the present environment. Based on this information, an
optimality model predicts which trait value(s) would predominate in the population as a
result of selection, given enough time in the current environment for an equilibrium to be
reached.1
Di!erent claims might be made about the relationship between an optimality model and
the actual evolutionary outcome. For instance, the assumption that selection is the sole
1Understood in this way, the optimality approach also includes game-theoretic models, which are used
when trait fitnesses are frequency-dependent. The fitness functions used in game-theoretic models take
into account not only the environment, but also the trait values (strategies) of the other members of the
population. For this reason, game-theoretic models often do not predict a single optimal trait value, but an
optimal distribution of trait values in the population. Some game-theoretic models even predict that there
will not be a stable distribution of trait values, but a continual cycle of change (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998). My points in this paper apply to this broad class of models, for they pertain to all equilibrium models
that do not represent genetic transmission, regardless of whether a single optimal trait value is predicted.
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evolutionary factor at work and that su"cient time has passed in the current environment
grounds the claim that a successful optimality model’s prediction will perfectly match the
observed trait value(s). Relaxing one or more of these assumptions results in various weaker
claims, e.g., that the model’s prediction would be fully accurate if enough time had passed.
Di!erent uses of optimality models are distinguished by these di!erent types of claims made
about the relationship between an optimality model and a target evolutionary outcome.
What I have termed the strong use of an optimality model occurs when a model is taken
to represent all important influences on the evolution of the trait modeled. The claim that
an optimality model represents all important causes of the evolutionary outcome in question
posits the tightest possible connection between the optimality model and the evolutionary
outcome. In order for this claim to be true—that is, in order for an optimality model to
represent all important causes of the evolutionary outcome—several conditions must be met.
The model’s fitness function and the range of possible trait values must be fully accurate in
order for the dynamics of selection to be accurately represented. Su"cient time must have
passed for the trait to reach equilibrium in order for these selection dynamics to have e!ected
the expected trait value(s). Finally, natural selection must be the only important influence
on the evolutionary outcome in question. This last condition ensures that the optimality
model’s representation of the selection dynamics is exhaustive of the evolutionary influences
on the outcome. Put more simply, this ensures that the optimality model tells the whole
story.
Implicit in this conception of the requirements for the strong use of optimality models
is the idea that selection is the only evolutionary factor that optimality models represent.
One might object that optimality models actually do represent other evolutionary factors
via incorporating constraints. I will not provide a decisive argument against such a view
here; what is required for a model to represent an influence—as opposed to neglecting or
black-boxing it—is a complicated question. Nonetheless, at least two considerations suggest
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that selection is the only evolutionary factor represented by optimality models. First, broad
physical and biological constraints always limit the range of evolutionarily possible trait
values, so every optimality model must incorporate these types of broad constraints. Yet
selection is sometimes considered to be the only evolutionary factor at work, despite the ubiq-
uity of background constraints. This is possible because these types of broad, background
constraints are not counted as distinct evolutionary factors, but simply are taken to reflect
the realm of physical and biological possibility. So at least for these types of constraints,
their incorporation into optimality models is not taken to constitute the representation of
additional evolutionary factors. Second, if optimality models only represent selection, then
this maintains a tight connection between the strong use of optimality models and adapta-
tionism. The tradition of linking optimality modeling to adaptationism suggests that some
use of optimality models is valuable to determining the truth of the various adaptationist
claims, and it seems that the strong use of optimality models is best positioned to play
this role. I thus proceed on the assumption that optimality models do not actually repre-
sent non-selective evolutionary factors, even when they take these factors into account by
incorporating constraints.
The strong use of an optimality model thus amounts to a claim about representation:
that the model accurately represents the selection dynamics, and that there are no other
important evolutionary factors to represent (for the target evolutionary outcome in ques-
tion). Unsurprisingly, the strong representational role intended with this use of optimality
models results in stringent standards for model testing. If the model’s predictions are in-
accurate, even to a small degree, then this is evidence that selection is misrepresented or
that there is another evolutionary influence on the outcome. From this it would follow that
the strong use of the optimality model in question is not successful—the model does not
represent all important evolutionary influences. Additional evidence regarding the success
of the strong use of an optimality model comes from comparing the optimality model’s pre-
5
dictions with the predictions of models that represent additional evolutionary factors, such
as genetic transmission and drift. If selection is the only important evolutionary influence
on an outcome, then the optimality model’s predictions should be at least as accurate as
those of these alternate types of models. Even observed variation around the predicted trait
value(s) may indicate a non-selective evolutionary influence and, consequently, the failure of
the optimality model in its strong use. The stringent evidential requirements that accom-
pany the strong use of optimality models are precisely those that have been identified as
important in generating support for adaptationism (Orzack and Sober, 1994; Brandon and
Rausher, 1996; Orzack and Sober, 1996).
Most of the philosophical discussion of optimality modeling regards the nature of the
connection between the optimality approach and adaptationism. Throughout this discussion,
the strong use of optimality models is implicitly assumed. For instance, Orzack and Sober
state that
The rationale for the focus on phenotypes is the notion that natural selection
will overcome any genetic or developmental constraints on an evolutionarily im-
portant trait (1994, 362).
That is, the justification given for optimality modeling—i.e., for focusing on phenotypic
change directly and ignoring the details of genetic transmission and development—is that
natural selection is the only important influence on the evolution of many traits (the “evo-
lutionarily important” ones). If selection is the only important evolutionary influence, then
genetic and developmental details can be safely ignored. This rationale is linked to the strong
use of optimality models, in which an optimality model’s representation of selection is taken
to give a complete picture of the evolutionary influences at work.
Yet the strong use of optimality models is not the only way, nor even the standard way,
that the optimality approach is employed in population biology. Optimality models are
routinely constructed for other purposes, purposes that involve weaker claims about their
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representational capacities. As outlined earlier in this section, di!erent claims can be made
about the relationship between an optimality model and a target evolutionary outcome, and
these di!erent claims distinguish di!erent uses of optimality models. The strong use of an
optimality model involves the strongest representational claim: that the model accurately
represents all evolutionary dynamics. A distinct use of an optimality model arises with
the weaker claim that the model represents the role of natural selection in bringing about
the evolutionary outcome. Absent is the claim that the model represents all evolutionary
influences. I call this the weak use of optimality models.
This weaker representational role of optimality models results in less stringent criteria for
a model’s success. In order to succeed in its weak use, an optimality model must accurately
represent the selection dynamics involved in producing the target evolutionary outcome,
but a model may still be successful even if factors besides selection influence the outcome.
Optimality models can reflect the e!ects of some non-selective influences by altering the
fitness function and/or range of possible trait values in response to the existence of genetic,
phylogenetic or developmental constraints. Other constraints, genetic drift, and insu"cient
time for the trait to reach equilibrium may be unaccounted for, which can lead to some
deviation between the model’s prediction and the observed trait value(s). Within limits, such
deviation does not impede the success of an optimality model. In its weak use, an optimality
model must accurately represent selection, but if selection is only part of the evolutionary
story, then observed trait values may vary from the values the optimality model predicts.2
Of course, the dynamics of the optimality model must correspond to the actual evolu-
tionary dynamics in some respects, viz., the model must accurately represent the dynamics
of selection. Most basically, in order for this correspondence to occur, it must be the case
that selection influences the evolutionary outcome in question. Additionally, the optimality
2If there is a large amount of deviation between predicted and observed trait values, then an optimality
model may be taken to fail, even in the weak use outlined here. This point is discussed in Section 2.
7
model’s fitness function must accurately represent the nature of this selective influence; the
range of possible trait values used in the model must be accurate; and enough time must
have passed for selection to have had a chance to influence the trait in question. If the
optimality model is successful in these regards, then there will be at least some qualitative
agreement between the model’s predictions and the observed trait values. When the influ-
ence of non-selective factors is small, or when constraints are used to account for the e!ects
of non-selective influences, an optimality model’s predictions likely will be quite accurate.
The successful weak use of an optimality model does not ensure that the evolutionary
outcome occupies a local optimum (or an evolutionary stable state; see footnote 1). As I
pointed out above, the strong use requires perfect correspondence between predicted and
observed trait values. In other words, for the strong use of an optimality model to be
successful, the optimizing assumption must be true: the trait must occupy the predicted
local optimum. In contrast to this, the weak use simply requires establishing that selection
influences the trait in question, and that the optimality model accurately represents this
influence. The trait may very well not occupy a local optimum.
One way to establish the intended use of an optimality model is thus to consider the ways
in which the model is tested. It is telling that the optimizing assumption is not often subject
to test. Population biologists typically do not devote much e!ort to establishing whether
the observed outcome represents a local optimum—that is, whether selection has driven the
population to an optimum, unimpeded by other evolutionary factors. Instead, the emphasis
is placed on testing the particulars of the fitness function and on confirming assumptions
regarding the heritability of the trait, the range of possible trait values, the existence of
selection, and the constancy of the environment. The success of these model components
is necessary for an optimality model to represent the role of selection, but this alone does
not confirm the optimizing assumption. More is required to generate support for the strong
use of an optimality model: the perfect correspondence of predicted optimum and observed
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trait value(s) is needed demonstrate that selection is the only important evolutionary factor.
The common tests of optimality models thus only underwrite what I have termed optimality
models’ weak use. Consequently, it appears that biologists who employ optimality models
seldom intend the strong use of these models.
Seger and Stubblefield point out this connection between testing and the uses to which
optimality models are put. They say,
In fact, the aims of real optimization studies are rarely to see how close a phe-
notype is to its optimal state. . . The hypothesis under test is usually not that a
phenotype is optimal, but instead that the specific assumptions embodied in the
model (e.g., the sources of selection, and the constraints) could account at least
in principle for the evolution of the phenotypes under study (1996, 109, 110).
This observation highlights that the strong use of optimality models—establishing whether
and the degree to which a phenotypic trait is optimal—is seldom the aim of the optimality
approach. It also raises a distinct point which deserves mention. The weak use of optimality
models upon which I have focused involves the claim that an optimality model accurately
represents the actual selection dynamics. There is another common use of optimality models
that is still weaker: optimality models are also used to develop and explore adaptive hy-
potheses at preliminary stages of investigation, when little is known about the evolutionary
factors at work. Used in this capacity, the aim of optimality modeling is merely to represent
possible selection dynamics, and the standards for success are correspondingly lower.3 This
may be what Seger and Stubblefield have in mind when they say that optimality models are
used to evaluate whether specific assumptions about selection and constraints, etc., could
account at least in principle for the target evolutionary outcome.
3The members of Joan Roughgarden’s lab helped me grasp this point. Also, note that the exploration of
possible evolutionary dynamics is consistent with the eventual aim of understanding the actual evolutionary
dynamics.
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Thus, despite the fact that most philosophical discussion of optimality models presumes
the strong use of these models, population biologists often employ optimality models in
weaker capacities. Because the strong use of an optimality model involves the claim that
the model represents all important evolutionary influences, the frequency of success for the
strong use is directly related to the fate of adaptationism. This is what Orzack and Sober
(1994), e.g., have in mind. In contrast, weaker uses of optimality models are not threatened
by critiques of adaptationism. One prominent example is the weak use upon which I have
focused here. In this weak use, an optimality model is used simply to represent the dynamics
of selection, which may comprise only one part of the evolutionary dynamics.
2 Lessons from the Adaptationist Critique
Although weaker uses of optimality models can be decoupled from adaptationism, critiques
of adaptationism certainly do have implications for the optimality approach. These critiques
have forcefully made the point that the ubiquity and omnipotence of selection cannot be
presumed. This and related insights have several implications for optimality models in the
various representational capacities in which they are employed.
First, it is a familiar point that optimality models should be carefully developed to in-
corporate any existing constraints (Maynard Smith, 1982). I said above that in their weak
use, optimality models may not incorporate all constraints that influence the evolutionary
outcome. The aim of the weak use is to accurately represent the dynamics of natural se-
lection, and since constraints are used to stand in for other parts of the evolutionary story,
optimality models can succeed at this aim even if they fail to reflect all extant constraints.
Nonetheless, if an optimality model neglects constraints that result in trait value(s) radically
di!erent from the predicted optimum, then this model is in some sense a failure. The model
represents the dynamics of selection, but it represents these dynamics as they would work
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in quite di!erent circumstances than in fact obtain—namely, in conjunction with fewer or
di!erent non-selective evolutionary factors. Such an optimality model is of limited interest
and would be much improved by the incorporation of significant constraints.
As a simple example, consider the evolution of kangaroo locomotion. Because kangaroos
travel by a series of leaps, changes that improve their ability to move in this way are selectively
advantaged and will likely evolve. Imagine, though, that bipedal running is even more
advantageous. In contrast to improved leaping ability, it is nonetheless highly unlikely that
kangaroos would evolve the ability to run. This is because initial changes in movement in
the transformation to bipedal running would be significantly maladaptive (Maynard Smith
et al., 1985). If bipedal running is selectively advantaged in a kangaroo population, then an
optimality model that reflects this in some sense accurately represents selection pressures.
Yet because initial changes in the direction of bipedal running are disadvantageous, bipedal
running is highly unlikely to evolve, so a model that represents the selective advantage
of running would be of limited or no interest. This example drives home the point that
optimality models are used to locate local optima. In order for the information gained
from an optimality model to be valuable, the predicted optimum should be local for the
population(s) of interest. This is why an accurate range of possible trait values is important
even for the weak use of optimality models. It also justifies the requirement that constraints
with a tremendous influence on the outcome be incorporated in optimality models, even in
their weak use.
A second consequence of the point that the ubiquity and omnipotence of selection cannot
be presumed is that it must be established whether a trait is subject to selection in the
first place. Gould and Lewontin (1979) catalog several possible non-selective sources of
evolutionary change. These include scenarios in which natural selection is not a factor at
all—such as the founder e!ect, the fixation of a less favorable allele due to drift, and the loss
of favorable mutations while still rare in the population. Additionally, selection acting on
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other, correlated traits might also drive the evolution of a trait, as happens with pleiotropy
and allometry. Even for the weak use of optimality models that I describe, it must be
established that the trait in question is in fact subject to selective pressures.
As one would expect, though, other implications of critiques of adaptationism are par-
ticular to the strong use of optimality models. Because the strong use of an optimality
model involves the claim that the optimality model represents all important influences on
the outcome, selection must be the only evolutionary factor that significantly influences the
target evolutionary outcome. This has several implications for the strong use of optimality
models. First, because an optimality model must provide an accurate representation of all
of the evolutionary dynamics (viz., the selection dynamics) to succeed in its strong use, the
model’s predicted local optimum must exactly match observed trait value(s). This require-
ment was discussed above: the model must predict the observed distribution of trait values,
and any unpredicted variation must be accounted for (Orzack and Sober, 1994; Brandon
and Rausher, 1996; Orzack and Sober, 1996). Establishing this exact correspondence is
needed to confirm the model’s optimizing assumption, that is, that the trait occupies the
local optimum.
Each of the other model components also must be carefully tested for the strong use of
an optimality model. As Gould and Lewontin (1979) point out, unmotivated assumptions
can lead to inaccuracies in a model, which can in turn conceal a disparity between predicted
and observed trait values—that is, the failure of optimality. The only way to ensure that
an incorrect representation of the evolutionary dynamics does not conceal the failure of
the optimizing assumption is to rigorously test the postulated dynamics to ensure their
accuracy. Components of the model that should be tested include, e.g., the details of the
fitness function; the assumption that there is phenotypic variability for the trait in question;
and the assumption that this variation is heritable.4
4Lloyd (1988) distinguishes between three types of confirmation: fit between predicted and observed
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An example of using ecological information to test a postulated fitness function is provided
by Parker’s (1970) work on the amount of time the male dung fly (Scatophaga stercoraria)
spends at a cowpat—the species’ mating location—before moving on to a new one (May-
nard Smith, 1982). When Parker found that male stay times are exponentially distributed,
he tested rates of females’ arrival to cowpats of various ages and the average amount of time
it takes a male fly to find a new cowpat. These measurements confirmed that the exponential
distribution of male stay times results in all male dung flies having the same reproductive
opportunity. In other words, the exponential distribution is optimal for each male fly.
Studies of industrial melanism in moths provide a nice example of testing the assumption
that there is heritable variation for a trait, as described by Reznick and Travis (1996). Trait
values in di!erent populations and in the same population at di!erent points in time can be
compared to establish the existence of available variation. Once this has been established,
one way to assess the heritability of this variation is to determine whether there is a genetic
basis for the trait. This can be accomplished by, e.g., transferring to a common environment
samples from populations that di!er in mean values for the trait. If di!erences persist, this
suggests that the trait has genetic influences (Reznick and Travis, 1996).
Lastly, to establish that an optimality model represents all important evolutionary influ-
ences, all of the constraints that are accounted for in the model must be relatively universal
constraints. Recall that optimality models always predict local optima: the best possible
trait values within some range of alternatives. According to biological parlance, if the range
of alternatives is limited only by universal constraints—broad constraints arising from phys-
ical and biological possibility (Maynard Smith et al., 1985), then these constraints are not
outcome; independent tests of assumptions; and variety of evidence. Testing the components of an optimality
model is an instance of the second type of confirmation. These components should be carefully tested for the
weak use of an optimality model as well, for this assures that the optimality model accurately represents the
selection dynamics. Yet the strong use of an optimality model creates a further reason to test the model’s
components, for undetected inaccuracies can conceal the failure of optimality, which undermines the success
of the strong use.
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taken to constitute non-selective evolutionary factors. Otherwise, selection could not possi-
bly ever be the only important evolutionary factor, since all optima are subject to universal
constraints. In contrast, if the range of alternatives is significantly constrained by features
peculiar to the specific population under investigation, or possibly to the species or higher
taxon, then the sources of these constraints are considered to be important evolutionary
factors in their own right.5 These include, e.g., particular developmental, phylogenetic,
and genetic influences on evolution. Because optimality models do not represent such non-
selective influences (see discussion in Section 1), the strong use of an optimality model is
only successful if all significant constraints are universal in nature.
Rigorously testing each component of an optimality model, including the optimizing as-
sumption, and considering the sources of constraints built into the model are necessary to
protect the strong use of optimality models from the criticisms of the optimality approach
that have arisen from concerns regarding adaptationism. First, carefully testing the compo-
nents of an optimality model and the optimizing assumption blocks Gould and Lewontin’s
(1979) charge that the optimality approach is merely an exercise in ingenuity, where optimal-
ity is assumed and imaginative stories are cooked up to support this assumption. Second,
accounting only for universal constraints in the model ensures that the model represents all
important evolutionary factors, namely natural selection. For this to be true, constraints
built into the model must not covertly introduce place-holders for significant non-selective
influences, such as developmental or genetic constraints.
The breadth of success enjoyed by the strong use of optimality models is thus limited by
the degree to which adaptationism is true, where adaptationism is taken to be the claim that
selection is the only important influence on most evolutionary outcomes. This conception
of adaptationism is like Orzack and Sober’s (1994) definition of strong adaptationism and
Godfrey-Smith’s (2001) definition of empirical adaptationism.6 This is as it should be. The
5See, for example, Maynard Smith et al.’s (1985) discussion of developmental constraints.
6Other distinct conceptions of adaptationism have been formulated; see Godfrey-Smith (2001) and
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strong use of an optimality model involves the claim that the model’s representation of selec-
tion dynamics provides an accurate picture of the important influences on the evolutionary
outcome in question. The breadth of success enjoyed by the strong use thus depends upon
how often selection is the only important evolutionary influence. This articulation of the
strong use of optimality models preserves the tight relationship between optimality mod-
els and adaptationism that is assumed in most philosophical discussions of the optimality
approach, and that is directly proposed by Orzack and Sober (1994).
However, this tight relationship does not hold for weaker uses of optimality models. As
discussed in Section 1, an optimality model may succeed in what I term its weak use, regard-
less of whether natural selection is the only important evolutionary factor. The debate over
adaptationism is relevant to this weak use of optimality models only via the methodological
points that optimality models should reflect significant constraints and that the influence and
dynamics of selection must be carefully evaluated. An implication of this separation between
the weak use of optimality models and the debate over adaptationism is that the successful
employment of an optimality model in its weak use does not provide evidence in favor of
adaptationism. If the weak use of optimality models enjoys widespread success, then this
demonstrates only that selection is often one evolutionary factor, potentially among many.
This is not enough to generate support for adaptationism, as it is understood here.
Orzack and Sober (1994) o!er the most systematic discussion of evaluating the impor-
tance of selection. They distinguish three distinct claims that might be made about the role
of selection:
(U) Natural selection played some role in the evolution of T .
(I) Natural selection was an important cause of the evolution of T .
(O) Natural selection is a su"cient explanation of the evolution of T , and T is locally




Adaptationism is claim that (O) is true for most nonmolecular traits. If the strong use of
optimality models enjoys wide success, according to the standards of success articulated by
Orzack and Sober and discussed here, then this would vindicate adaptationism. In contrast,
the success of an optimality model in its weak use ensures only that selection dynamics played
some role in the evolution of the trait. The broad success of the weak use of optimality
models thus underwrites only the claim that (U) is true for many traits, which falls short
of adaptationism.
Distinguishing between the weak and strong uses of optimality models thus clarifies the
relationship between the optimality approach and adaptationism. Most biologists accede
that concerns over adaptationism warrant certain methodological correctives (e.g., Maynard
Smith, 1982, 5). This basic point applies to the weaker uses of optimality models, as well
as to the strong use. The further ideas that the justification for optimality modeling is
adaptationism and that optimality models can be used to generate support for adaptation-
ism (Orzack and Sober, 1994) apply only to the strong use of optimality models, wherein
an optimality model is purported to represent the only important evolutionary factor, viz.
natural selection. The legitimacy and usefulness of weaker uses of optimality models thus
are not threatened by the fate of adaptationism, whatever that fate may be. The optimality
approach can be used to represent the dynamics of selection without placing any bets on the
relative importance of selection compared to other, non-selective evolutionary factors such
as genetic drift and developmental, phylogenetic and genetic constraints.
3 Weak, Not Powerless
At the start of this paper, I claimed that optimality modeling could be decoupled from
adaptationism. Up to this point, I have argued that only the strong use of optimality models
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requires a commitment to adaptationism for its justification, and that population biologists
often intend weaker uses for the optimality models they construct. Nonetheless, one might
be concerned that the optimality approach is of little importance to population biology when
it is prised apart from the issue of adaptationism. Biologists may often intend or seem to
intend weaker uses of optimality models, but perhaps they are mistaken in doing so, or
perhaps I am mistaken in representing their intentions in this way. In the weak use I have
focused on, optimality models are used to represent selection dynamics but not to establish
that selection is the only important evolutionary factor. But because optimality models
do not represent non-selective evolutionary factors, it seems that the role of an optimality
model in its weak use is simply to represent a single evolutionary factor—selection—which
may be of quite limited significance. Of what interest are optimality models decoupled from
adaptationism, if they have such a narrowly defined role?
It would be mistaken to think that the optimality approach is by itself a su"cient
approach to modeling evolutionary change. The possibility of non-selective evolutionary
factors—developmental, phylogenetic and genetic constraints; drift; etc.—must be consid-
ered, even if the consideration of these factors leads them to be eliminated as possibilities.
Because the potential of non-selective factors warrants investigation, the optimality approach
is not by itself a su"cient approach to modeling evolutionary change.7 This is so at least when
non-selective factors are suspected to have shaped the outcome. The optimality approach
is simply one useful approach among others—but it is useful nonetheless. When selection
influences an evolutionary outcome, the nature of this influence bears investigation. Crit-
icisms of adaptationism notwithstanding, selection is a significant factor in the evolution
of many traits that receive attention from biologists. The optimality approach provides a
7An anonymous referee has pointed out that an appreciation for the weaker uses of optimality models
might be used to argue for methodological adaptationism—that the best approach to studying biological
systems is to look for adaptations (Godfrey-Smith, 2001). I agree that this is possible, but it is not a road I
would take. As this discussion indicates, I think a myopic focus on adaptations is misguided; non-selective
influences on evolution warrant investigation in their own right.
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tractable way to model the dynamics of selection. Optimality models represent the nature of
selection’s influence, and they are tractable in virtue of their neglect of non-selective factors
like drift and the details of genetic transmission.
Indeed, optimality models can be useful even when non-selective evolutionary factors
cause observed trait values to vary significantly from predicted values. The failure or quite
limited success of a carefully constructed optimality model itself has information to o!er
about the evolutionary scenario at hand, for this suggests that additional, non-selective
factors are unaccounted for (Seger and Stubblefield, 1996; Godfrey-Smith, 2001). If a well-
confirmed fitness function indicates that natural selection would result in the population
having a particular trait value, and yet the measured trait value di!ers markedly from this
predicted value, one has reason to wonder what is responsible for the discrepancy. A pluralist
perspective regarding evolutionary change allows for many possible causes of deviation from
the predicted optimum. The environment might have recently undergone a change relevant
to the trait’s fitness; some genetic, developmental or phylogenetic constraint may exist; the
trait may be subject to an unexpected fitness tradeo!; drift may have significantly a!ected
the outcome; etc. The failure of an optimality model’s prediction leads one to investigate
such possibilities and may suggest particularly likely influences. This facilitates insight into
the influence of non-selective factors on the target evolutionary outcome.
There is another, related way in which the failure of an optimality model can provide
insight into evolution. The comparison between the actual result of evolution and the theo-
retical result of natural selection acting alone can itself be of interest, even apart from leading
to an improved recognition of non-selective evolutionary factors. Orzack and Sober (1994)
suggest something along these lines. They think that optimality models are important even
when they fail, since “[a] fundamental contribution of such models is that they describe what
organisms should do in particular instances” (1994, 378). Optimality models detail what the
result would be if natural selection had been responsible for the evolution of the trait in
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question. A comparison between this and the actual result of evolution yields insight into
the role of selection in that particular instance of evolution.
These ideas are illustrated by Orzack’s (1986) analysis of an optimality model for the sex
ratio of Nasonia vitripennis, a parasitic wasp. The optimality model, developed by Werren
(1980), predicts that the optimal sex ratio varies according to population structure. When
the population is subdivided so that siblings compete for mates, the sex ratio will be female-
biased, whereas wide dispersal before breeding creates the opportunity for outcrossing, and
sex ratios will be much more equitable (Hamilton, 1967; Werren, 1980). For the wasp N.
vitripennis, these two scenarios are respectively realized (a) when a female visits a host that
has not been previously parasitized, and (b) when eggs are laid in a host already containing a
wasp brood. The optimality model thus predicts that the proportion of males in the second
brood in a host should directly correlate with the existence and size of the first brood. A
large first brood provides the opportunity for the second brood to outbreed, whereas a small
or nonexistent first brood results in a second brood that will largely inbreed.
However, Orzack (1986) finds that these predictions fit the data poorly. Sex ratios in
previously parasitized hosts di!er significantly from the predicted ratio, and the observed sex
ratios also vary significantly. Figure 1 plots some of Orzack’s data against the curve predicted
by the optimality model. Orzack proposes a “nonoptimal model” that would account for
this variability. According to this model, a female visiting a host can potentially detect a
pheromonal signal left by an earlier egg-laying female. When a female detects this signal, the
sex ratio of her eggs is altered to increase proportion of males, but this is not accomplished
with great precision. Some variation in sex ratio is thus introduced. Further, if the first
brood in the host is small, then the pheromonal signal will be reduced. The second female
visiting is less able to detect the signal, and the sex ratio of her eggs remains female-biased.
Orzack suspects that this accounts for how sex-ratio control in N. vitripennis fails to conform
to the pattern expected on the basis of the optimality approach. Of course, evidence must
19
Figure 1: Orzack’s (1986) comparison between the sex-ratio curve predicted by Werren’s
(1980) optimality model and the sex ratios found for di!erent ratios of second-brood size to
first-brood size. This figure compiles the data from several experiments on two strains of
Nasonia vitripennis, the Ithaca wildtype and scarlet eye strains.
be gathered in order for this nonoptimal model to be confirmed.
Despite the failure of the optimality model for the wasps’ sex ratio, Orzack emphasizes
the importance of developing the model:
I believe that the local mate competition model of Hamilton (1967) gives in-
sight into the potential direction of sex-ratio evolution and into possible selection
pressures on sex-ratio modification in response to inbreeding and to variation in
population structure (1986, 355).
Orzack proceeds to cite the patterns in his data that do not conform to Hamilton’s insights
and points out that these patterns may conflict with the optimality model of sex-ratio evo-
lution, and that they must be accounted for by a successful theory of sex ratio in the wasp
20
under study.
This work exemplifies the ways in which a well-motivated optimality model can be valu-
able, even when the model’s predictions are not born out. The optimality model of N. vit-
ripennis’s sex ratio o!ers insight into the selection pressures involved, and it directs attention
toward the patterns that do not conform to expectations. These contributions—insight into
the selection dynamics and focusing attention toward non-selective factors—are made by
optimality models in their weak use of representing the role of selection. This is true when
the predicted and observed trait values di!er widely from each other, as well as when there
is closer correspondence to the model’s predictions.
The strong use of optimality models, where a model is taken to represent all important
evolutionary factors, is thus not the only important role that optimality models play. In this
paper I focus on one prominent weaker use of optimality models, where an optimality model
is simply used to represent the role of selection in bringing about an evolutionary outcome,
without the claim that this is the only important influence on the outcome. This weak use
is common in population biology, and for good reason: it o!ers a tractable way to gain
insight into the dynamics of selection and the evolutionary role played by these dynamics.
Other weaker uses of optimality models are also valuable, including using optimality models
to initially explore the plausibility of adaptive hypotheses. This use is especially valuable
when little is known about the population under investigation. Because such weaker uses
of optimality models do not involve claims about the relative importance of selection, the
optimality approach is able remain a well-founded and important tool of population biology,
regardless of the fate of adaptationism.
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